Risks of Shock and Awe

At a rally in Sellersburg, Indiana, on Saturday, October 28, President Bush told supporters: "Five years after September the 11th, too many Democrats still do not get it. The best way to protect the homeland is to find the enemy and defeat them overseas." This sounded like the Pet Goat Strategy.

The Pet Goat Strategy. When the President was considering his options after getting news of the 9/11 attacks in a Sarasota, Florida, classroom, pupils read out to him about a girl who had a pet goat that ate too many things. Her angry dad says that the goat must go. But the goat butts a man allegedly planning to steal the family car. The goat becomes a hero and stays. Mission accomplished.

So the Pet Goat Strategy is: Cover up problems with a show of force. Shock and awe. Full speed ahead and damn the torpedoes. This is the essence of the imperial Wolfowitz doctrine.

Risks of the Pet Goat Strategy. The problem is that the goat still eats too many things, hero or not. The risks of the aggressive Pet Goat Strategy include the following:
- It stretches a volunteer army thin. U.S. military doctrine in the Weinberger-Powell era was more cautious because the Pentagon management did not want to put the troops unnecessarily at risk.
- A preemptive strike, without full support of allies, may undermine future cooperation.
- The “shock and awe” may wear off and the mission may be far from accomplished.
- The President’s ability to respond to another crisis may be limited. Implementation of a preemptive plan may be weak. In fact, by a 15-point margin, the “most likely” U.S. voters believe Democrats would do a better job in Iraq, according to a national AP-AOL poll.